Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1987

Peters & Company v. Abco Construction : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dale M. Dorius; attorney for appellant.
Ephraim H. Fankhauser; attorney for respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Peters & Company v. Abco Construction, No. 870062 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/338

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

D
K
5

... r
j

IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
PETERS & COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case NOi 870062-CA

^tt(b)

ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
et al.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the decision dated January 9, 1987, of the
Honorable WHITNEY D. HAMMOND, judge, in Seventh Circuit Court of
Uintah County, State of Utah.

DALE M. DORIUS
P. O. Bok U
29 SouthI Main Street
Brighara <pity, UT 84302
Attorney for Appellant

E. H. FANKHAUSER
660 South 200 East
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT

8411i

Attorney for Respondent

RECEIVED
MAY2 01987

Court ot Appeals

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT

POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE MAJOR
ISSUE OF THE TRIAL, NAMELY THE ISSUE OF ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION. AMPLE EVIDENCE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS
PRESENTED, AND THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT
RESPONDENT WAS BARRED FROM RECOVERY BY THE DOCTRINE OF
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT ADDITIONAL
AMOUNTS UNDER THE CONTRACT AND IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES.
AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT IT
WAS THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES IN MAKING ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION TO FULLY EXTINGUISH ALL LIABILITY TO EACH OTHER.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE THAT
RESPONDENT HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH THE SPECIFICATIONS
CONTAINED IN THE CONTRACT. AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED THAT
THE "EXTRA WORK" FOR WHICH RESPONDENT MADE A CLAIM WAS
ACTUALLY WORK CONTAINED IN THE CONTRACT.

POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR THE RESPONDENT ON
THE ISSUE OF THE "EXTRA WORK." THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF APPELLANT'S LIABILITY SINCE THERE WAS NO
VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT FOR THE
EXTRA WORK.
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POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO
VALID OFFSET THAT RESPONDENT SHOULD ABSORB. AMPLE EVIDENCE
WAS PRESENTED TO WARRANT AN OFFSET SHOULD A CONTRACT HAVE
BEEN FOUND TO EXIST.
:ONCLUSION
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE MAJOR
ISSUE OF THE TRIAL, NAMELY THE ISSUE OF ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION? WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SUPPORT A
RULING BV THE TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENT WAS BARRED FROM
RECOVERY BY THE DOCTRINE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION?
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11.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN AWARDING ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS
UNDER THE CONTRACT? DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY FEES TO RESPONDENT? DOES A FINDING OF ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION EXTINGUISH ALL LIABILITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES?

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE THAT
RESPONDENT HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH THE SPECIFICATIONS
CONTAINED IN THE CONTRACT? WAS AMfLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO
SUPPORT THE RULLING THAT THE "EXTRA WORK" FOR WHICH
RESPONDENT MADE A CLAIM WAS ACTUALLY WORK CONTAINED IN THE
CONTRACT?
IV.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING APPELLANT LIABLE
FOR THE EXTRA WORK PERFORMED BY RESPONDENT? DOES THE
EVIDENCE SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO VALID
CONTRACT BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT FOR THE EXTRA
WORK?
V.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO
VALID OFFSET? WAS THERE AMPLE EVIDENCE TO WARRANT AN
OFFSET SHOULD A CONTRACT BEEN FOUND TO EXIST?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Abco Construction, Inc., is a Utah coporation with its
principal place of business in Box Elder County, Utah. Through its
Secretary-Treasurer, Branson Neff, Appellant entered into a prime contract
with the Uintah County School District ("School pistrict") to construct an
auditorium addition ("the project") to the West junior High School in Uintah
County.
Respondent, Peters & Company, is a painting contractor. Through its
President, Ted Peters, Respondent submitted a bid to provide all labor,
equipment, material and services to complete the; painting for the project.
3

T. 10). Respondent's painting bid was accepted. The painting Respondent
;ontracted to do was begun in the first part of February., 1985, (T. 11) under
:he direction of Respondent's paint foreman.. Craig Talbot. (T. 113)

Toward

the end of February, 1985, the painting had been substantially completed (T.
4). On or about March 22, 1985, a written subcontract agreement for the
painting was signed by Appellant, as general contractor of the project, and
by Respondent. (T. 30). The contract price was $9,305. (T. 11). Also as part
of the contract was the guarantee that Respondent would complete the work
in accordance with the plans and specifications. (T. 11). Respondent further
promised to make corrections or fix-ups as required. (T. 29 & 30).
During work on the project, Appellant had trouble with the metal
doors and the hardware for the doors. Some of the hard-ware didn't align
with the pre-drilled holes in the doors. Consequently, some of the holes
needed to be redrilled to accommodate the hardware, and some of the predrilled holes had to be filled with putty and sanded before the doors could be
painted. (T. 32, 106). Also, some of the doors were dented and rusting so
they needed to be sanded and primed before they could be painted (T. 33).
Because of the conditions of the doors, Respondent told Appellant there
would be a charge for the additional preparatory work on the doors. In the
presence of Mr. Talbot, Respondent's paint foreman. Respondent and
Appellant negotiated an agreeable solution: Appellant would furnish the
materials and the equipment and Respondent would supply the labor. (T. 107108). No further discussion about the doors took place, but then, in an
invoice dated November 10, 1986, Respondent submitted to Appellant a
$2660 claim for the preparatory work on the doors.
On or about February 20, 1985 (T. 14) Respondent received a
telephone call from Mr. Randy Green ("the Architect"), senior achitect with
4
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Respondent completed the brick sealing around the first of March,
985. (T. 16). Then Respondent began submitting separate invoices for the
rick sealing to the architect (T. 21 & 73) and to Appellant. (T. 16).
Although Respondent considered the brick sealing completed, the
irchitect was dissatisfied with the results (T. 76 & 85) because drywall
nud, stains (T. 113), paint drippings (T. 58), and white dust that appeared to
)e from the sanding of the drywall (T. 77), had been sealed into the brick.
[J. 77). Upon close inspection, Respondent's work was rejected by the
architect (T. 83-85), by Mr. Mark Trussler, another architect supervising the
project (T. 76), and by Dirk Harris, the School District representative on
construction projects. (T. 153). On April 4, 1985, Mr. Trussler prepared a
punch list itemizing things to be corrected and/or completed on the project,
including the unsatisfactory sealing work on the brick walls. (T. 87-88).
The punch list read: "Clean brick walls where brick sealer was applied over
dirt and dust." (T. 124, 149). Because Craig Talbot, Respondent's paint
foreman at the project site (103), refused to strip the sealer and clean the
dirty brick walls (T. 150), Appellant telephoned Respondent and requested
that Respondent send someone more cooperative to remedy the problems
with the sealed bricks. (T. 151).
Almost two weeks passed before Respondent and his crew returned to
the project site. (T. 118). By then Appellant and his crew (T. 49) had spent
97-1/2 hours (T. 48 & 152) trying various methods such as acid washes (T.
115) and wire brushes (T. 49) to strip the sealer off the brick. Upon his
arrival to the project site, Respondent said he would take over from that
point. (T. 49)
On April 20, 1985, Respondent submitted an invoice to Appellant for
work completed on the project. This invoice indicated a balance of

6

$1,013.86, which was the balance owing on the contract. This invoice
included no other charge for any "extra work" such as the brick sealing
Respondent had negotiated with the architect to do or the additional door
preparatory work Respondent resolved with Appellant or the brick stripping
and cleaning. (T. 18). Respondent was sending invoices for the brick
cleaning directly to the architect (T. 20, 22, 71) and the School District. (T.
5, 16).
Respondent sent subsequent invoices to Appellant. These invoices
always separated the amount due for the work completed under the contract
from the amount due for the brick cleaning: $1,013.86 for the balance on the
contract and $2,780.00 for the brick cleaning. (T. 21). [Note: The charge of
$2,780.00 for the brick cleaning and/or stripping did not reflect the amount
in the change order which was for $2,640. (T. 22& 23).]
In July or August of 1985, Respondent, with the express intention of
settling the matter of the balance due on the contract, telephoned Appellant.
(T. 23-25 & 44). Appellant informed Respondent that Appellant would send a
check for the balance owing on the contract but that there were some back
charges for Appellant's having spent 97-1/2 hours at $20.00 per hour (T.
152&153) stripping the sealer off and cleaning the dirty brick walls. After
some discussion, Appellant and Respondent negotiated a final settlement of
$931.00. (T. 26, 45). During the negotiation, Appellant and Respondent also
reached the understanding that Appellant owed Respondent nothing for the
brick cleaning unless and until the School District made payment to
Appellant for this work. (T. 45).
Based on this negotiation. Appellant prepared (with blue ink) the
check for the agreed settlement of $931.00 and circled the words "in full"
on the back of the check. (T. 46, 53, 157). Appellant's circling of the words
7

n full" distinguished this particular check from any of the previous checks
espondent had received from Appellant (T. 54, 55). Respondent received
his check on August 6, 1985 (T. 45), and with red ink, Respondent endorsed
he check. (T. 53). Respondent testified at trial that this check for the
legotiated amount of $931.00 was "payment in full under the contract." (T.
176).
Meanwhile, Respondent continued billing the Architect and the School
District for the cleaning of the brick walls. (T. 21, 73). However, the
School District's policy was that requests for payment of work done outside
a contract would not be honored unless and until the change order was
completed and approved. (T. 63 & 69).
Maintaining that Respondent was responsible under the contract for
cleaning the brick walls (T. 148, 154), the School District ultimately
rejected the change order. (T. 148, 153). The explanation for this rejection
was that the cleaning of the brick walls before the application of the sealer
was the painter's responsibility. (T. 148,154). Consequently, neither
Respondent nor Appellant received payment from the School District for the
brick cleaning. (T. 157).
In spite of Appellant's payment in full under the contract (T. 176),
Respondent submitted an invoice dated November 10, 1986, to Appellant, in
the invoice. Respondent made a $2,660 claim for Respondent's preparatory
work on the project's metal doors. (T. 36). This invoice was the first notice
Appellant had received after paying the settlement check of $931.00 that
Respondent considered any further amount owing. (T. 36). This invoice also
was the first notice Appellant had received since the solution negotiated
for the door preparations. Respondent admitted at trial that this work
claimed in the invoice was work Respondent performed under the original
8

contract work; the claim was not for any of the brick sealing or cleaning. (T.
37,47). The Architect also testified at trial that these "extras" for which
Respondent was billing were not "extras" but, rather, was work that was
part of the contract (T. 72). Moreover, Respondent admitted at trial that the
billing for 'work on the doors was made after Respondent had released
Appellant on the contract. (T. 47).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in failing to rule that Respondent was barred
from recovery by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Although
Appellant pled accord and satisfaction, the trial court did not rule on the
issue. Ample evidence was presented that Respondent and Appellant
negotiated a final settlement for work on the contract and also for the brick
sealing. The agreed settlement was for $931.00. Appellant prepared a
check for this amount and circled the words "in full" on the back of the
check, and Respondent accepted and endorsed the check. Appellant's circling
of the words "in full" distinguished this final check from previous checks
Respondent had received from Appellant. Furthermore, Respondent testified
several times at trial that this final check constituted "a payment in full on
the contract" and "a release of Appellant" from all further claims.
The trial court erred in awarding additional amounts under the
contract. The "extra work" of preparing the doors for painting was actually
work required under the contract. Respondent sent the first invoice for this
work more than a year after a release of Appellant from all further claims.
As the evidence and testimony given at trial supported a finding of accord
and satisfaction with regards to the final settement, Respondent should
have been barred from recovery. Likewise, Respondent should have been
9

barred from claiming attorney fees assessed for litigating an already
negotiated and satisfied claim.
Respondent's contract with Appellant contained a provision that
required the painter to examine surfaces which were scheduled to be
painted, stained, varnished, etc. and to report to the contractor any surfaces
which could not be put into proper condition for finishing by customary
preparation. The provision further stated that the application of the first
coat would "constitute acceptance of surfaces as fit and proper to receive
finish." Thus, Respondent had the responsibility to ensure that the brick
walls were properly prepared before the application of the sealer, and
Respondent's application of the sealer constituted his acceptance of the
condition of the walls. Consequently, when the work was inspected and
rejected, Respondent had no valid basis upon which to make a claim for the
stripping and subsequent cleaning of the dirty brick walls.
The "extra work" of sealing and cleaning the brick walls -was work
Respondent negotiated with the Architect to do. The Architect telephoned
Respondent asking that Respondent bid on "extra work" which consisted of
adding a sealer to the interior brick walls in the project and other specified
rooms in the school. During the course of the negotiation, Respondent gave
the Architect a bid of $2641.00, and the Architect accepted the bid. At no
time was Appellant party to the negotiations, nor did Appellant sanction
them or the contract. Consequently, Appellant cannot be held liable for
payments under a contract the Architect instigated and finalized with
Respondent.
Even if the trial court were correct in ruling that Respondent was
entitled to payments for the extra work, Appellant was entitled to a ruling
that there was an offset. This offset resulted because Respondent was
10

almost two weeks in returning to the project to strip and clean the dirty
brick walls and the delay was stopping other subcontractors from
continuing their work. Consequently, Appellant and his crew had to spend
97-1/2 hours at a cost of $20.00 attempting to remedy Respondent's poor
workmanship. The total cost to Appellant was $1950 00. This cost should
have been deducted from any award to Respondent.

ARGUMENT

POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE MAJOR ISSUE OF
THE TRIAL, NAMELY THE ISSUE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. AMPLE
EVIDENCE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS PRESENTED, AND THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT RESPONDENT WAS BARRED FROM RECOVERY
BY THE DOCTRINE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
The Court in Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Company. 701
P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985) indicated that accord andjsatisfaction arises when:
.. .the parties to a contract mutually agree that a
different performance than that required by the original
contract w i l l be made in substitution of the performance
originally agreed upon and that the substituted agreement
calling for the different performance w i l l discharge the
obligation created under the original agreement. Id. at 1082.
A similar definition is that "(a)n accord and satisfaction is a method
of discharging a contract or settling a claim arising from a contract by
substituting for such contract or claim an agreement for the satisfaction
thereof, and the execution of the substituted agreement." Cannon v. Stevens
School of Business. Inc.. 560 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Utah 1977).
Another definition is as follows:
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To constitute an accord and satisfaction there must be an offerIn full satisfaction of the obligation, accompanied by such acts and
declarations as amount to a condition that if it is accepted, it is to
be in full satisfaction, and the condition must be such that the party
to w h o m the offer is made is bound to understand that if he accepts
it, he does so subject to the conditions imposed
The accord is the
agreement and the satisfaction is the execution or performance of
such agreement
1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 1, pp.
301-302.
Appellant's advocacy of an accord and satisfaction in the present
case is based on four propositions: Respondent's contacting of Appellant in
July or August of 1985, the actual negotiation which resulted in a
settlement agreement, Respondent's endorsement of Appellant's final
$931.00 check, and Respondent's repeated admissions during crossexamination at trial.
In July or August of 1985, Respondent telephoned Appellant with the
express intent of settling the balance on the contract work and also the
work of sealing and cleaning the brick walls. Appellant informed
Respondent that there were some back charges for Appellant's time spent
trying to strip the sealer off the dirty brick walls. Respondent responded by
indicating that he had not yet been paid for the brick sealing to which
Appellant replied that if and when the School District made payment to
Appellant for this work, Appellant would pay Respondent. The negotiation of
claims and offsets resulted in a mutual determination that $931.00 was
owing to Respondent.
Appellant prepared a check for the negotiated amount and then circled
the words "in full" on the back of the check. Respondent admitted at trial
that Appellant's circling of the words "in full" distinguished this final check
from any of the previous checks Respondent had received from Appellant.
12

With the circled words "in full" appearing on the back of the check,
Respondent accepted and endorsed it.
Besides Respondent's endorsement of the final check, Respondent
repeatedly admitted during cross-examination at trial that the $931.00
represented "payment in full on the contract" and a "release of Appellant"
from all further claims. Respondent's admissions should have been given
considerable v/eight by the trial court since these admissions contradicted
Respondent's claim that payment was still owing for work Respondent
admitted was performed under the contract.
Besides the above propositions supporting a finding of accord and
satisfaction, there was the traditional contract element: a meeting of the
minds on this negotiated agreement between Appellant and Respondent.
Moreover, Respondent's endorsement of Appellant's final check itself
constituted an accord and satisfaction. Therefore, it is of no legal
consequence that Respondent may have later regarded the check as
something short of "full payment." The court in Marton Remodeling v.
Jensen. 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985) considered a similar situation. In that
case, Marton received a check from Jensen that he did not regard as payment
in full even though the check contained a condition that "endorsement hereof
constitutes full and final satisfaction." As he endorsed the check, Marton
added the words "not full payment" below the condition. The court ruled
that"... the creditor may not disregard the condition attached." Id. at 609.
Applying this to the present case: Appellant's check contained the
Respondent words "in full" circled on the back; consequently. Respondent
cannot now refute the condition for acceptance of that check.
Based upon the above definitions of accord and satisfactionand based
upon the evidence and the testimony presented at trial, it would be safe to
13

conclude that an accord and satisfaction did arise and that the trial court
srred in failing to rule that Respondent was barred from recovery by the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT ADDITIONAL
AMOUNTS UNDER THE CONTRACT AND IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES. AMPLE
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT IT WAS THE
INTENTION OF THE PARTIES IN MAKING ACCORD AND SATISFACTION TO FULLY
EXTINGUISH ALL LIABILITY TO EACH OTHER.
The trial court awarded Respondent $2641.00 for the preparatory
work done to the metal doors. Testimony given at trial by the Architect
supported Appellant's contention that this work was work under the
contract and as such was not "extra work." Even so, Appellant made
concessions when Respondent made a claim in anticipation of having to do
additional preparatory work on some of the doors: Appellant would furnish
the materials and the equipment and the Respondent would supply the labor.
Then, over a year later, Appellant received notice in the form of an invoice
that Respondent considered some further amount owing. In an invoice dated
November 10, 1986, Respondent submitted to Appellant a $2660 claim for
the preparatory work done to the doors. Given the fact that this was
contract work and given the fact that Respondent admitted at trial that the
billing for work on the doors was after the release of Appellant of any
further liability on the contract, this claim never should have been honored
by the trial court.
Furthermore, accord and satisfaction would have extinguished all
liability between the parties, including attorney fees Evidence and
14

testimony presented at trial support the conclusion that it was the
intention of Appellant and Respondent to fully extinguish all liability to
each other arising out of their contract. This extinguishment of liability
included liability for attorney fees assessed tor litigation prusued on the
contract. See, eg., Quealy v. Anderson. 714 P.2d 667 (Utah 1986).
Had the court properly ruled that there was an accord and
satisfaction, neither the award for preparatory work to the doors nor the
award for attorney fees would have been granted.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE THAT
RESPONDENT HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH THE SPECIFICATIONS CONTAINED IN
THE CONTRACT. AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL THAT THE
"EXTRA WORK" FOR WHICH RESPONDENT MADE A C1AIM WAS ACTUALLY WORK
CONTAINED IN THE CONTRACT.
Respondent's painting contract with Appelant contained the
following provisions:
3.1 Inspection
3.1.1 Condition of Surfaces, the painter shall examine
surfaces which are scheduled to receive paint, stain, varnish or
other coatings and report to the contrator any surfaces which
cannot be put into proper condition for finishing by customary
cleaning, sanding, puttying, or other similar preparation
operation. Application of the first coat shall constitute
acceptance of surfaces as fit and proper to receive finish.
3.2 Surface Preparation
I
3.2.1. Remove hardware, machine surfaces, plates,
lighting fixtures and similar items wehich are not to be
painted, or apply protective coverings before commencing
surface preparation. Re-install these items in each room after
painting is complete and dry.
3.2.2 Clean surfaces free of dirt, rust, scale, grease and
moisture. (T. 85-86).
15

Before Respondent began sealing the brick walls, he had the
'esponsibility to ensure that the surfaces were clean and properly prepared
'or the sealer application; this surface preparation was part of the work
Respondent contracted to do. By failing to so prepare the brick walls,
Respondent breached a condition of his contract.
Because of the poor workmanship, the work was rejected by the
architects and by the School District construction project representative
Subsequently, the sealer had to be stripped and the brick walls cleaned
before the sealer could be reapplied. Because Respondent's painting foreman
refused to do the work and because it was almost two weeks before
Respondent returned to the project site, much of this work was completed
by Appellent and his crews.
As with the wall preparation, Respondent likewise had the
contractual duty to prepare the doors for painting. All surface preparation
to the doors was contract work. However, Appellant conceeded that some
of the doors required additional preparation, so Appellant proposed an
agreeable solution with Appellant providing the materials and the equipment
and Respondent furnishing the labor.
Appellant had already paid Respondent in the final $931.00 payment
for the work completed under the contract; this payment constituted a
payment in full. By ignoring this payment and the specifications contained
in the contract, the trial court's award to Respondent of $2,641.00 for the
brick cleaning and sealing and/or the door preparation constituted, in
essence, a double payment for the same work.

16

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR RESPONDENT ON THE ISSUE OF
THE "EXTRA WORK." THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S
FINDING OF APPELLANT'S LIABILITY SINCE THERE WAS NO VALID CONTRACT
BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT FOR THE "EXTRA WORK".
The evidence presented at trial supported Appellant's contention that
preparatory work on the doors was work under the contract. As work under
the contract, it was paid for in full when Appellant tendered the final check
on Augusts, 1985.
The other work described during the trial as "extra work" was the
sealing and/or cleaning of the brick walls. Testimony at trial revealed that
on or about February 20, 1985, Respondent received a telephone call from
Mr. Randy Green ("the Architect"). The Architect asked that Respondent bid
on extra work which consisted of adding a sealer to the interior brick walls
in the project and other specified rooms in the school. (T. 13). In the course
of the negotiation (T. 17, 64, 74) for the extra work, Respondent quoted a
price which the Architect accepted. [The trial records indicate that
Respondent testified that the price was "$2780.00" (T. 15) whereas the
Architect testified that the price was "$2,641.00" (T. 65).] At no time
during the negotiation between Respondent and the Architect did Appellant
become a party. (T. 51). Neither did Appellant sanction the negotiation nor
the resulting contract. (T. 162).
Earlier in the project, the Architect had asked Appellant when he was
going to seal the brick walls and was told by Appellant that he was not
going to seal them. When the Architect asked why not, Appellant explained
that the contract did not provide for the sealing of the bricks.
Consequently, Appellant was surprised when Respondent, having completed
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he contracted work and left the project site, appeared again and announced
hat he was to seal the bricks. (T. 145).
Respondent initially billed only the Architect (T. 20, 22, 71) and the
School District (T. 5, 16) for the brick sealing. Only later did he begin
including this work on invoices to Appellant. Then, the invoices separated
this work from work completed under the contract.
It is well established in Utah as elsewhere that whether there is a
binding contract depends on the intent of the parties. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin formulated it thus: "There is no meeting of the minds where the
parties do not to contract

'* Interocean Shipping Company v National

Shipping and Trading Corporation (2nd Cir. 1975) 523 F.2d 527.
Furthermore, the general rule is that"... no recovery can be had for
extra work or materials unless performed or supplied with the knowledge
and consent of the party to be held liable." Krieg v. Union Pacific Land
Resources Corporation. 525 P.2d 48, 54 (Or. 1974).
The evidence and the testimony presented at trial did not support a
finding of a valid contract between Appellant and Respondent for the "extra
work." Consequently, the trial court erred in founding Appellant liable for
extra work for which he did not contract.

Point V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO VALID
OFFSET THAT RESPONDENT SHOULD ABSORB. AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED TO WARRANT AN OFFSET SHOULD A CONTRACT BE FOUND TO
EXIST.
Evidence was presented at trial that Respondent had applied sealer
on bricks that were stained, splattered with paint and drywall mud, and
coated with white dust that appeared to be from the sanding of the drywall.
18

Upon inspection by the architects and School District representative, the
work was rejected. This su.. ition never would have occurred had
Respondent not breached the condition of his contract dealing with
preparation of surfaces before painting.
As a result of Respondent's poor workmanship jnd delay in returning
to re-do the work, Appellant and his crew spent 97-1/2 hours at a cost of
$20.00 per hour stripping the sealer off and cleaning dirty brick walls. The
total cost of their labor was $ 1950
There is a well-established '"cost of repair" rule. This rule relates to
damages applicable to breach of construction contracts:"... dama.jes are
awarded based upon the reasonable cost of construction and completion in
accordance with the contract." County of Man cor . v Walsh and Oberg
Architects. Inc., 16 Ariz.App 439, 494 P.2d 44, 46 (Ariz. 1972:'
If a valid accord and satisfaction did not arise and if Appellant was
liable under aa valid contract for the extra work, then the trial court should
have reduced Respondent's award by -he $ 1" 50 it cent Appellant to remedy
Respondent's poor workmanship

CONCLL 'JOJ,
The trial court's award to Respondent of $2,641 plus interest ^ n
attorney fees should be set aside
The case should be remanded for a resolution of the following issues:
Did an accord and satisfaction J; ise?
In the alternative:
Was a valid contract for the extra work made between
Appellant and Repondent? If so, What amount of off et against the contract
price should Respondent absorb?
19

ADDENDUM
3NTENTS
indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
udgment
)rder Amending Judgment dated January 9, 1987
Change Orders
DATED this 18th day of May, 1987.

Q„ p
DALEMTDORTUS

Attorney for Appellant
P. 0. Box U
29 South Main Street
Brighara City, UT 84302
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Served

the

copies thereof,

foregoing Brief of Appellant
postage prepaid,

to E.

by

mailing

four

H. FANKHAUSER, Attorney

for Respondent, 660 South 200 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, UT
84111 this 18th day of May, 1987.
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tftti M. Darin Afe tt

E. H. FANKHAUSER.
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Plaintiff
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH COUNTY, VERNAL DEPARTMENT

PETERS & COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,

*

FINDINGS OF FACTS
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*
Civil No.

vs.

*

ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
BRANSON G. NEFF, FRED A.
MORTON & COMPANY, AMERICAN
CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING
PENNSYLVANIA, DANA LARSON
ROUBAL & ASSOCIATES, INC.

*

86 CV 067

*
*
*

Defendants.

Trial of this action was held at a regular term of the
above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, November 24, 1986
without jury, before the Honorable Whitney D. Hammond.
Plaintiff corporation was represented by its attorney,
E. H. Fankhauser.

Defendants' ABCO Construction, Inc.,

Branson G. Neff, Fred A. Morton & Company, American Casualty
Company of Reading Pennsylvania and Dana Larson Roubal &
Associates were represented by their attorney, Dale M.

-1-

Dorius.

Each o£ the parties presented witnesses that were

duly sworn and testified; and each of the parties presented
evidence to the Court which was received and adduced by the
Court; and the matter having been argued and submitted to the
Court for its determination and decision; and the Court,
having considered the testimony and evidence presented, being
fully advised in the premises and for good cause appearing
finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant, ABCO Construction Company, is a Utah

Corporation and as such entered into a contract with the
Uintah County School District to construct improvements at
the West Valley Jr. High School located in Uintah County,
State of Utah.
2.

Peters & Company entered into a subcontract

agreement in writing with Defendant, ABCO Construction
Company, to provide labor and material for the painting
required to be done in connection with the construction of
the auditorium addition at the West Jr. High School under
ABCO's contract with Uintah County School District.
3.

Plaintiff, Peters & Company, performed services,

labor and furnished material to do the painting under its
subcontract at the agreed price of $9,305.00.
4.

Peters & Company, at the time the work was

performed, was a licensed painting contractor with the State

-2-

of Dtah.
5.

The work performed by Plaintiff under its original

subcontract was completed on or about April 9, 1985 and met
the standards in the industry.
6.

1

Plaintiff, at the request of Randy Green, the

supervising architect, submitted a bid to do extra work
consisting of sealing brick walls, which bid was accepted by
the architects, ABCO Construction, the contractor and the
owner, Uintah County School District*
7.

The labor performed and material furnished in

applying sealer to the auditorium side walls, halls, rooms
101, 102, 103, 104, 108 and 109, the music room and sorting
room, amounted to $2,641*00.

The work was substantially

completed on or about March 5, 1985.
8.

A portion of the work was unacceptable to the

architect.

Plaintiff performed the required corrective work,

which was approved and accepted by the architect, and the
extra of sealing the walls was completed on or about April 1,
1985.
9.

Defendants have the burden of showing what work, if

any, did not meet standards in the industry and present
evidence of any claimed off sets.
10.

Plaintiff has been paid for the labor performed and

materials furnished except for the extra of sealing the
walls.

There remains due and owing to Plaintiff the sum of

$2,641.00 as of August 1, 1985.

-3-

11.

ABCO Gonstruction, and the owner, Uintah County

School District, signed the change order for the extra of
sealing the walls on or about July 12, 1985.

Payment for the

extra to Plaintiff became due and payable on or about August
1, 1985.
12.

Defendant, Fred A. Morton Company, as agent for

American Casualty Company, provided a payment and performance
bond as required by Title 14-1-14, Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, to insure payment for all labor and materials in
connection with the construction of the auditorium addition
at the West Jr. High School, Uintah County, Utah, under the
contract between ABCO Construction Company and the Uintah
County School District.
13.

Plaintiff sent several statements to Defendant,

ABCO Construction Company and Dana Larson Roubal & Associates
for payment of the extra owing to Plaintiff.

Demand was made

upon ABCO Construction on or about August 26, 1985 and on or
about November 29, 1985.

Plaintiff has incurred costs and

attorney's fees in connection with the bringing and
prosecution of this action.

A reasonable sum to be awarded

Plaintiff as attorney's fees is $800.00.
14.

Defendants', Branson G. Neff, individually and Dana

Larson Rouball & Associates were not parties to the said
contract between Plaintiff and ABCO Construction for the
painting and the extra of sealing the walls.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court concludes

-4-

as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Defendant, ABCO Construction, Inc., contracted with

Plaintiff to perform labor and furnish materials in doing
painting work in connection with the construction of the
auditorium addition at the West Jr. High School.
2.

There is due and owing to Plaintiff for labor and

materials for the extra work of sealing the walls the sum of
$2,641.00, with accrued interest at the legal rate of 10% per
annum from August 1, 1985.
3.

Judgment should be entered against Defendants, ABCO

Construction Company, Inc., Fred A. Morton Company and
American Casaulty Company, in favor of Plaintiff in the sum
of $2,641.00 plus accrued interest from August 1, 1985 to
November 30, 1986 at the rate of 10% per annum in the amount
of $352.50.
4.

Plaintiff should be awarded judgment for attorney's

fees against Defendants, ABCO Construction Company,
Fred A.

Morton Company and American Casualty Company,

in the sum of $800.00.
5.

Plaintiff should be awarded judgment for its costs,

together with post judgment interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from the date of judgment until the judgment is

-5-

paid in full.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

day of December, 1986,

BY THE COURT:

WHITNEY D. HAMMOND
CIRCUIT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed to Dale M. Dorius, Attorney for Defendants, P.O. Box U
Brigham City, Utah 84302 in accordance with Rule 2.9, Rules
of Practice, on this

^P^^

day of December, 1986.

^ vvy
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E. H. FANKHAUSERf
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Plaintiff
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 8*111
Telephone: 534-1148

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH COUNTY, VERNAL DEPARTMENT

PETERS & COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,

*
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

*
Civil No.

86 CV 067

ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
BRANSON G. NEFF, FRED A.
MORTON & COMPANY, AMERICAN
CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING
PENNSYLVANIA, DANA LARSON
ROUBAL & ASSOCIATES, INC.
Defendants.

This cause came on for trial at a regular term of the
above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, without jury, on
November 24, 1986, the Honorable Whitney D. Hammond
presiding.

Plaintiff was represented by its attorney,

E. H. Fankhauser.

Defendants were represented by their

attorney, Dale M. Dorius.

Each of the parties presented

witnesses that were duly sworn and testified; and presented
evidence that was received and adduced by the Court; and the

-1-

matter having be^n argued and submitted to the Court for its
determination and decision; and the Court, after
consideration of the testimony and evidence presented made
and entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,
now, therefore, in accordance therewith:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded judgment against

Defendants, ABCO Construction Company, Inc., Fred A. Morton
Company and American Casualty Company for the sum of
$2,641.00, together with accrued interest from August 1, 1985
to November 30, 1986 at the rate of 10% per annum in the
amount of $352*50.
2.

Judgment for attorney's fees for the use and benefit

of Plaintiff's attorney against Defendants, ABCO
Construction, Fred A, Morton Company and American Casualty
Company in the sum of $800.00.
3.

For Plaintiff's costs of Court assessed at $218.75,

said judgments to bear interest from the date hereof until
paid in full at the judgment rate of 12% per annum.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

day of December, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

WHITNEY D. HAMMOND
CIRCUIT JUDGE

-2-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certifya true and correct copy of the foregoing
was mailed to Dale M. Dorius, Attorney for Defendants,
P.O. Box U, Brigham City, Utah 84302, in accordance with Rule
2.9, Rules of Practice, on this

-3-

day of December, 1986.

E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Plaintiff
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

0*1* M . Doriuft Al*

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH COUNTY, VERNAL DEPARTMENT

PETERS & COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,

ORDER AMENDING JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

Civil No.

86 CV 067

vs.
ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
BRANSON G. NEFF, FRED A.
MORTON & COMPANY, AMERICAN
CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING
PENNSYLVANIA, DANA LARSON
ROUBAL & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendants.

*

*

Defendants1 Motion for New Trial, having been denied by
Order of the Court dated December 30, 1986; and said Order having
provided that the Judgment, in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants
should be amended by Order to specifically provide that Plaintiff
had no cause of action against Defendants, Branson G. Neff, as an
individual or Dana, Larson, Roubal & Associates, Inc.; and that
Plaintiff's action against said Defendants should be dismissed
with prejudice; now, in accordance therewith:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the action of
laintiff against Defendants, Branson G. Neff, individually and
efendant, Dana, Larson, Roubal & Associates, Inc., be dismissed
ith prejudice for no cause of action in that said Defendants
rere not parties to the contract between Plaintiff and ABCO
Construction, Inc., for the painting and extra of sealing the

The Judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Peters & Company, Inc.,
against ABCO Construction, Inc., Fred A. Morton & Company, and
American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania heretofore
entered by this Court shall remain in full force and effect until
satisfied.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

^r

day of January, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

&L

WHITNEY D. HAMMOND
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed to Dale M. Dorius, Attorney for Defendants, 29 South Main
Street, Brigham City, Utah 84302 on this

/3£*

1987.
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day of January,

ORDER
AIA DOCUMENT C701

Distribution to:
OWNER
ARCHITECT
CONTRACTOR
FIELD
OTHER

•D
•
D
•
CHANGE ORDER NUMBER:

PROJECT:
WEST JR . HIGH SCHOOL
(name,address) East U.S. HIGHWAY

Roosevelt, Utah

INITIATION DATE:

6-5

March 6 , 1985

TO (Contractor):

r

~l

ABCO CONSTRUCTION
Route 1, Box 116
Corrine, Utah 84307

L

ARCHITECT'S PROJECT NO:

4510283

CONTRACT FOR:

General Constructio

CONTRACT DATE:

March 5, 1984

I

You are directed to make the following changes in this Contract:

1.

Add one coat of Chem-Stop brick sealer to interior brick walls:
a. To ceiling height in rooms 101, 102, 103, 104 (new brick), 108,
109, 119 and 122.
b. To elevation 107'-4" in Rooms 110, 113, 114 and 115.
Price as approved by telephone conversation between Randy Green (DLRA) and
Ted Peters (Peters & Co.) 2/22/84 and authorized by Dirk Harris (Uintah
School District) 2/22/85.
Add
$2,641

SUMMARY:
Finish Allowance
Less Previous Changes
Less This Change
REMAINING ALLOWANCE

$
$

10,000.00
3,351.15
2,641.00
4,007.85

Not valid until signed by both the Owner and Architect.
Signature of the Contractor indicates his agreement herewith, including any adjustment in the Contract Sum or Contract Time.

The original (Contract Sum) (CXOfem&<^&WXi)WtWmM was
$
1 ,009 ,233 .01
Net change by previously authorized Change Orders
$
( 308 ,495 ,6
The (Contract Sum) («X*XttmXaUUfXffltmK prior to this Change Order was
$
700,737 .3:
The (Contract Sum) (f^XMM*&***£&****£&*) will be (toKfeK&d* (&&&&*&$ (unchanged)
0(
by this Change Order
$
The new (Contract Sum) (gltfXX^tf JU&XXttKXXXM including this Change .Order will be . . . $
7 00,7 37 .32
The Contract Time will be (iXXttX$9) (<?8fcX<£K&X (unchanged) by.
( 0 ) Days.
The Date of Substantial Completion as of the date of this Change Order therefore is
Authorized:
DANA LARSON ROUBAL & ASSOC.
ABCO CONSTRUCTION
• UINTAH HIGH SCHOOL
A

O T g & So. Temple

ffiCT

UT

8 M

P A T ' X ^ ^

To N u T CT R Box 116
^ o o t e v e l t , Utah

DATE

7-

/ ?

ffCTest
,

,

- ^

AIA DOCUMENT G701 • CHANCE ORDER • APRIL 1976 EDITION • AIA« •
© 1978
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, 3735 NEW YORK AVE., N V\ \\ \SHINCTON, D C 20006

200 South

^ f l , Utah

84078

DATE
G701 — 1978

P A I N T I N G & D E C O R A T I N G
outh Richards Street • Sal t L a k e C i t y

February 25, 1985

Utah

84101

•801-355-2500

As of this date we are D are not D bondable for an amount in
excess of the enclosed bid We will D will not D bond this
project (premium by general contractor)
Our bondman is KJSfir-l Qrd
, Phone #
State License #
35B5?-B
State Bid Limit $500,(WO
We acknowledge seeing addenda #
.none ,
(No acknowledgement means "None")

Dana Larson Roubal & Assoc. Inc.
19 West South Temple
Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

West Jr. High School
Roosevelt, Utah
Interior Brick Seal

Gentlemen:
We will apply one coat of DEM-STOP to the Auditorium side walls at
a level of 714"(from the rear ) platform, stairs and vestibule, and
rooms 101, 102, 103, 104, 108, 109, the music room and the sorting
room for the price indicated below:

£ PROPOSE to furnish labor and material — complete in accordance with above specifications, and subject to conditions
tund on both sides of this agreement, for the sum of

*Two thousand seven hundred eighty and no/100-

Payment to be made as follows' _

By _

}

Tn f u l l upon completion.

ACCEPTED The above prices, specifications and conditions are
satisfactory and are hereby accepted You are authorized to do
the work as specified Payment will be made as outlined above
No interest charge if paid within 30 days 1 Wo interest per month
or 1B% per year charged on all past due accounts

Date of Acceptance

dollars (I2J80.00

Note This proposal may be withdrawn by us it not accepted
within
days
All material is guaranteed to be as specified All work to be
completed in a workmanlike manner according to standard
practices Any alteration or deviation from above specifications
involving extra costs will be executed only upon written orders,
and will become an extra charge over and above the estimate All
agreements contingent upon strikes, accidents or delays oevond
our control Owner to carry fire tornado and other necessary
ins jranc* Our workers are fullv covered b% i*,pr*">*nr

-February 25»!/1985|
C3

©

2

<

O

o

inl

-I
TO

Ui

^ Mr,?./Randy. G r e e n ^ U -,,,,,:
^DANA£LARSONl ROUBA^tf ASSOCV INC!
|l9Wes^5oa|TempT:e%- , * ? * * » *
t -Siilte-600B^^^f-.'••-•.

Salt LakeCityI Utah 84101

Q
«8

CD
2

2

p l e a s e ! : . s i V i n d i c a t i n g your acceptance"and mall; the o r i g i n a l i , l ^ ! p
^back;:.t61:m^^^
>

?
i:ptrERS^ycoBHB^A
GJ.-tesffl _

Ted/Peter^^^tt1"

, . ; i v : ^ ^ ^ - ^

7$
a>
CO

o

CM«!

Enclosure^

/

r i m )

OllilR
IECT:

West J r .

U
D

/

High School A d d i t i o n

e. address) R o o s e v e l t .

CHANCE O R I H R N U M U t R :

v

IfS-W

UT
INI I I A 1 I O N D A IE:

Contractor):
j

,

< n as>P**.

r

1

ABCO Construction
2 ^ 5 North 7600 West
Corinne, UT 8^307

I

J+-20-P>5

A R C I I I I I C T ' S I'ROIECT N O :

CONIRACI (OR:

^51028300

General Construction

,
|

C O N IKAC 1 I M I t :

March 5 ,

1 9 ^

c directed to make the f o l l o w i n g (.honors in lliis Contract:

Clean brick after it had been sealed.
Material
97.5 hr § 20/hr

63.85
1,950.00
2,013.80

Overhead & Profit 15%

302.07
$2,315.87

1 sitytH'tl Ity hollt llic IKxiicr *m\ AMliili-iI
M" f'tmtrMkW Itwtir<lll"< hi* .t({iiTilirnl tirieuilli. iniluilim1, .u\) ,ttl|ii<Jui<-iii in llic ( IIMII.KI Vint m < iinlr.iil lime

C.onlr.itl Sum) (Gunianlecd Maximum Cosl) w.i<i
Y previously nulhorizod Change Otdcrs
Sum) (GunMitleed Maximum Cost) piiur hi litis Change Outer \va<
Sum) (Guaranteed Maximum L'osl) will he (im reaped) (det teased) (IMKI».TII|;C<I)
mnnc Order
r.ic.l Sum) ((iii.it,nnlccd Maximum Gtsl) im ludini; this Chnni'c Older will he . . .
imc will he (increased) (detreasrd) (un<hait|;ed) hy
'
hslanlial Complclion as of the dale of litis Change Older thetefnre is

on, Roubal & Assoc*
h Temple. Suite 600

ABCO Construction
(

2%j? N Worth 7600 West

A«MH*M>

U t y t UT 8*H01

$
$
( 12

(Days

Authorised.
Uintah School D i s t r i c t
ov

%Jj> West 200 South

Addicts

Corinne, UT 8'»307

Vernnl, Utnh

MY

MY

IMH

DA ft

•f
•
CIIANC.f DKOIK
•
A m i Vim f 1)11 If IN' •
MA'
•
•"••1711
ffcMtf Ol AKf IMUC'tS, t;r»NtW>OKk A\f . N\V W \MIIN<.M»N I M JIMNM.

$
$
$

C 7 0 I --- I97B

CilAmvjt

ORDER
AIA DOCUMENT C701

OWNER
ARCHITECT"
CONTRACTOR
FIELD
OTHER

U

D
D
D
D

PROJECT:

EXHIBIT
CHANGE ORDER NUMBER:

(name, address)
I N I T I A T I O N DATE:
T O (Contractor):

r

~l

I

(

ARCHITECT'S PROJECT N O :
CONTRACT FOR:

CONTRACT DATE:

You are directed to make the f o l l o w i n g changes in this Contract:

/ / • ^ /.W/r-. y V ' / A ^ ' j •
X

^JL

J & J£fo

/A*i

GU^

yo.

S?M,,57u > " ' •<-< 3cy^Ctr6's>

Not valid until signed by both the Owner and Architect.
Signature of the Contractor indicates his agreement herewith, including any adjustment in the Contract Sum or Co

The original (Contract Sum) (Guaranteed Maximum Cost) was
$
Net change by previously authorized Change Orders
$
The (Contract Sum) (Guaranteed Maximum Cost) prior to this Change Order was
$
The (Contract Sum) (Guaranteed Maximum Cost) will be (increased) (decreased) (unchanged)
by this Change Order
$
The new (Contract Sum) (Guaranteed Maximum Cost) including this Change Order will be . . . $
The Contract Time will be (increased) (decreased) (unchanged) by
The Date of Substantial Completion as of the date of this Change Order therefore is
Authorized:
ARCHITECT

CONTRACIOR

OWNER

Address

Address

Address

BY.

BY.

BY_

MTE

DATE

DATE

\ D O C U M E N T C701
•
CHANGE ORDER
•
APRIL 1978 EDITION
•
AIA*
•
<D 197fl
\MERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, 17J5 NEW YORK AVE , N.W.. WASMINC.K >N D C 20006

EXHIBIT

" D

Any damagee to the OenefeJ Contractor for delay caused by the Subcontractor shall be deducted by the General Contractor from the agreed price for said work, subj
however, to the option of the General Contractor to terminate said Subcontract for default as herein elsewhere provided.
The General Contractor shall not be liable to the Subcontractor for delay to the Subcontractor's work by the ect. neglect or default of the Owner. General Contractor or t
Architect, or by reeaon of fire or other casualty, or on account of riots or of strikes, or other combined action of the workmen or others, or on account of any acts of God.
any other cauee beyond General Contractor's control or on account of any circumstances caused or contributed to by the Subcontractor; provided, however, notwlthstandi
anything else contained herein, the General Contractor will be liable to the Subcontractor for damages he incurs as a result of any acts or failures to act by the Owner whi
delays or suspends the Subcontractor's work only to the extent the Owner Is liable tor such damages and actually pays the General Contractor for such damages. It bei
expressly understood that the only obligation the General Contractor has to Subcontractor under this proviso Is to pass on to the Owner any claim Subcontractor has I
damages or delays caused by Owner and to pay to Subcontractor as a result of the Subcontractor's claim for delays caused by the Owner.
The Subcontractor expressly agrees that an extension of time shall constitute the Subcontractor's sole and exclusive remedy should the Subcontractor be delayed, integer
with, disrupted, or hindered In his work by the General Contractor, in which case the General Contractor shall owe the Subcontractor therefore only an extension of time f
completion equal to the delay caused and then only If a written notice of delay Is made to the contractor within forty-eight (48) hours from the time of the beginning of ti
delay, Interference, disruption, or hindrance; and under no circumstances shall the General Contractor be liable to pay to the Subcontractor any compensation tor su<
General Contractor-caused delays. The Subcontractor acknowledges and agrees that the Subcontractors failure to give a written notice of delay as prescribed here
constitutes a waiver by the Subcontractor to any extension of time for such delay, disruption, Interference or hindrance.
The Subcontractor's written notice of delay must be by certified mail and on a form provided by or suitable to the General Contractor and contain evidence establishing th,
the delay In completion of the work arises from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Subcontract The General Contractc
shall eecertaln the facts and the extent of the delay end extend the time for completing the Subcontract, when in his sole judgment and discretion an extension
epproprterte. The GenereJ Contractor's findings shall be final and conclusive as to the Subcontractor s entitlement for time extensions.
THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR, may, at any time, on written order, without notice to the surety and without Invalidating this Subcontract, make changes in the work herei
contracted for and the Subcontractor agrees to proceed with the work as directed by the General Contractor's written order. Any claim for an extension of time (o
completion or tor adjustment of the Subcontract oriee shall be resolved at the time the General Contractor directs performance of the extra or changed work and, In abeenc*
of a written confirmation given/by the General Contractor of the amount of such an extension or ad|ustment at the time such extra or changed work is ordered, it i
expressly understood that no such extension or adjustment is due the Subcontractor for performance of the changed or extra work. If the changed or extr*
work causes an Increeee or decrease In the Subcontrector's cost of per forms nee of the Subcontract work, or in the time required for performance, within a reasonable hn>»
after the General Contractor's written order, the Subcontrector shall submit to the General Contractor an estimate showing what effect the proposed extra work or change n
estimated to have on the Subcontrector price; and, If after receipt of such estimate the General Contractor gives the Subcontractor written authority for such extra work ano
for the adjustment of the Subcontract price In accordance with such estimate, the Subcontractor shall perform such extra work and the Subcontract price shall be adjusted t y
the amount set forth In such estimate, provided that no payment shall be due the Subcontractor for such changed or extra work until the General Contractor has receiver
payment from the Owner for said changed or extra work performed by the Subcontractor.
It Is expressly agreed that except in an emergency endangering life or property no additions or changes to the work shall be made except upon written order of the Gen^ai
Contractor, and the General Contractor shall not be liable to the Subcontrector for any extra labor, materials, or equipment furnished without such written order No officer
employee or agent of the General Contractor la authorized to direct any extra work or changed work by oral order.
Nothing herein contained shall excuse the Subcontractor from proceeding promptly with the prosecution of the work as ordered In writing by the General Contractor, SIK>
tenure to do to ahell constitute a broach of this Subcontract.
THE SUBCONTRACTOR AGREES to Indemnify the General Contractor against and hold the Contractor harmless for any and all claims, demands, liabilities, losses
expenses, suits, and actions (Including attorney's feee) tor or on account of any injury to any person, or any death at any time resulting from such Injury, or any damage to
any property, which may arise for which may be alleged to have arisen) out of or In connection with the work covered by this Subcontract even though such injury, death >.
Jamage may be (or may be alleged to be) attributable In part to negligence or other fault on the part of the General Contractor or his officers, agents or employees
ir>6l»gatlon of the Subcontractor to Indemnify and hold the General Contractor harmless shall not be enforceable If and only If it be determined by arbitration or judici*
ffocoading that the injury, death or damages complained of was attributable solely to the fault or negligence of the General Contractor or his officers, agents, or employee
nd not In any manner In any part attributable to the Subcontractor The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the General Contractor for all sums which the Gene'a.
ontractor may pay or be compelled to pay In settlement of any claim hereunder, including any claim under the provisions of any workmen's compensation lew or any put
x employees benefits which the General Contractor may adopt The General Contractor shall be entitled to withhold from any payment otherwise due pursuant to this
ubcontract such amount or amounts as may be reasonably necessary to protect It against liability for any personal injury, death or property damage resulting from th«
irtormanoa of the work hereunder.
HE SUBCONTRACTOR SHALL KEEP HIMSELF and the General Contractor fully advised as to ail pertinent local and regional labor agreements and practices, lnclud» n,
>y toca) labor union contract negotiations occurring during the term of this Subcontract. In the event the Subcontrector has a collective bargaining agreement, either locai*
nationally, with a labor union engaged In local negotiations or If the Subcontractor will be affected, either directly or indirectly, by the outcome of said local negotiation*
a Subcontractor agrees to join said negotiations, If legally permissible, and participate or associate itself with the local contractor or contractors Involved in sa>w
QOtJoxione In en endeavor to reeotve the labor dispute.
I labor used throughout the work shall be acceptable to the Owner and the General Contractor and of a standing or affiliation that will permit the work to be carried on
rmontouety and without delay, and that will In no oaae or under any circumstances cause any disturbance, interference or delay to the progress of the building, structured
factttttee, or any other work being carried on by the Owner or the General Contractor in any other town or city in the United States.
i Subcontractor agrees that where hie work or the General Contractor's work is stopped or delayed or interfered with by strikes, slow downs, or work interruption
jlting from the acts or failure to act of the employee of the Subcontractor In concert, or by any breech of the provisions above, then the General Contractor, at his option
' terminate this Subcontract and proceed In accordance with the provisions of the Subcontract. The General Contractor shall have the remediee provided for herein eve
*gh the Subcontractor's employees may be engaging In work stoppage solely as s result of a labor dispute Involving the Generel Contractor or others and not in <*
mar Involving the Subcontractor.
iASE Of ANY DISPUTE between the Subcontractor and General Contractor, the Subcontractor agrees to be bound to the General Contractor to the same extent that »•
ire! Contractor Is bound to the Owner by the terms of the General Contract and by any and all decisions or determinations made thereunder by the parly or board >
orlzed In the General Contract. The Subcontractor also agrees to be bound to General Contractor to the same extent the General Contractor Is bound to Owner Dy r •
decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, whether or not Subcontrector is s party to such proceeding If such a dispute is prosecuted or defended by the Gem* rector against Owner under the terms of the General Contract or In court action, the Subcontractor agrees to furnish all documents, statements, witnesses, and 01
matton required by the GenereJ Contractor for such purpose end to pay or reimburse General Contractor for all expenses and costs, If any, incurred in conn**
with. It Is expressly understood that aa to any and all work done and agreed to be done by the Subcontractor and as to any and ail materials, equipment or ser .
ihed or agreed to be furnished by Subcontractor, as to eny and all damages, if any, incurred by Subcontrector. in connection with this project, the General Contf«.
never be liable to the Subcontrector to eny greater extent than the Owner Is liable to Gener J Contractor No dispute shall interfere with the progress of construe
to Subcontractor agrees to proceed with his work as directed. 0espite disputes he may have against the General Contractor, the Owner, or other parlies
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